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Abstract 
For its global shock channeling problem, a steady increase of offshore 
international debt after the Great Recession in emerging countries 
has been noticed. This paper insists that after the crisis, the offshore 
debt is substituted for onshore debt when emerging countries 
struggle to finance onshore international bonds. In other words, 
emerging countries exploit offshore debt to manage the level of 
international liquidity stable. For instance, when global uncertainty 
grows, global non-oil commodity price decreases, the domestic 
government fortifies an inflow of international capital or the domestic 
financial market is unreliable, the offshore debt replaces the onshore 
debt.  
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1) What is the problem of Offshore debt issuance? 
After the Great Recession, international debt has been split 
into two types in emerging countries. Offshore international debt has 
been extremely increased its issue in emerging countries than before. 
Before analyzing the phenomenon deeply, let me clarify a definition 
of the keyword. Offshore international debt is defined as the bond 
which is issued in a primary market outside the home country, which 
guarantees the bond, by the Bank in International Settlements (BIS). 
Offshore bond issuing process demands additional stage, such as a 
subsidiary in another country to issue international debt in the 
country’s market.  
The popular and well-known type of international bond is to 
issue an international bond directly from their market. Such a bond 
will be called onshore debt to compare with offshore debt. Conversely, 
offshore debt is issued indirectly by requiring another process; 
intra-company capital flows. In other words, offshore debt is the 
bond that the head office does not issue a bond by themselves but 









Figure 1 shows two processes, which are issuing offshore 
international debt and onshore international debt. The blue line 
indicates the onshore debt issuance process, while the yellow line 
depicts the entire process of the offshore debt issuance.  
 







Coming back to the phenomenon of the issue, before the Great 
Recession, offshore debt issuance in emerging countries did not 
surge apparently. But after the crisis, the opposite situation happened 
as Chung et al. (2014) and Kim, Shin (2019) paid attention. Figure 2 
shows the offshore and onshore international debt issuances which 
are issued by emerging countries from 1990-Q1 to 2018-Q4. The 
blue bar indicates onshore debt issuance measured by gross issues, 
while the yellow bar is offshore debt issuance measured by gross 






































































































































than a majority and the amount of it was negligible. However, after 
the Great Recession, the majority of a proportion of the post-crisis 
offshore debt shows more than half of international debts and the 
amount of outstanding of offshore debt increased after the Great 
Recession. 
 Economists cautioned such events because of unconscious 
problems to emerging markets. Chung et al. (2014) alerted that the 
increasing amount of non-financial corporations’ offshore 
international debt will attack the domestic monetary aggregates and 
their financial conditions. Specifically, because the offshore debt once 
more crosses the international financial market indirectly, the 
domestic market has additional linkage toward global finance. 
However, governments rarely identify the amount of offshore debt 
because it only reveals as an intra-company capital, i.e. the 
government is not able to control the situation of offshore debt. 
Furthermore, Kim, Shin (2019) conducted panel VAR to verify that 
the offshore debt in the emerging market became a crucial channel 
between the global financial market and the domestic market. Even 
more, when a global crisis occurs, offshore debt has tremendous 




2) Research Problem 
Even though an increase in offshore debt issuance and their 
potential risk, there is no paper for discovering the main causes of 
the increase. For that reason, this paper is to unveil the causes of an 
increase in offshore debt issuance. The main idea has been brought 
from Kim, Shin (2019), which suspected the government’s capital 
restraint toward international capital flow. To be specific, emerging 
countries with strengthened capital control tend to be vulnerable to 
the offshore debt.  
Based on the above finding, I identify the main reason for the 
offshore debt situation. This paper insists after the Great Recession, 
offshore international debt seems to reverse its role from the 
onshore debt, stabilizing the level of international liquidity apart from 
global and domestic conditions. In other words, the emerging 
countries desire to exploit the offshore debt issuance to manage the 
international liquidity risk. Specifically, not only domestic restraint 
on capital but also other important global and domestic factors seem 
to affect the movement of offshore debt issuance; global uncertainty, 





In the following sections, I will discuss how I selected 
meaningful variables. Then, I will address how I modified panel 
regression for finding the main causes, especially using interaction 
terms. Interaction effects are adjusted to explicate which variables 
have been changed through the crisis and to overcome empirical 
obstacles such as limited observations. In the end, I will analyze the 
meaning of the offshore debt’s coefficient as the substitute for the 





 Factors of international capital flows have been discovered 
for centuries, while offshore debt did not surge as the main question. 
To select suspect determinants for offshore debt, I primarily referred 
to Forbes, Warnock (2012) and Byrne, Fiess (2016). Forbes and 
Warnock discovered the main factors of extreme events of 
international capital flows in emerging countries. They found global 




flows. Byrne and Fiess distinguished capital flow from the common 
global flow and idiosyncratic flow, and they searched for each main 
reason. For idiosyncratic flow, they pointed out the financial 
openness, institutional quality, and human capital. Four other 
references were also considered, and their list is as follows: Contessi 
et al. (2013), Dell’Erba, Reinhart (2015), Evans, Hnatkovska 
(2014), Reinhart, Reinhart (2008). 
For the first, most references, such as Dell’Erba, Reinhart (2015) 
and Evans, Hnatkovska (2014), they frequently included global 
growth, as global real GDP growth. Secondly, global real interest 
rates and global uncertainty have been included in the global factors. 
Byrne, Fiess (2016) and Reinhart, Reinhart (2008), who are 
interested in emerging countries, added global consumer price 
change. Reinhart and Reinhart highlighted that emerging countries 
are significantly influenced by commodity price because their 
economies are contributed by commodity exports toward advanced 
economies. As this paper are dealing with emerging countries, I 
accept their view and include it as a ruling variable. 
For domestic factors, each economy growth is essential. Some 




capital flow by real interest rates, while others did. However, I 
respected the setting of Byrne, Fiess (2016), which included real 
interest rates deflated with ex-post consumer price. The additional 
two domestic components are financial openness1 and the financial 
structure, which illustrate characteristics of the financial market. 
First, financial openness indicates how the country is liberalized 
against outside capital flows. Second, financial structure means how 
much financial market is depth, truthful and stable. At least four out 
of six references included two components, so I finally included those 
two factors for describing the domestic financial market.  
 
1) Data 
The emerging countries was selected by Kim, Shin (2019), but 
I excluded some countries because of missing data. Selected fifteen 
emerging countries are as follows: Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Ukraine. Data has been collected from 2000-
                                           
1 Capital Control and Financial Openness have been used as opposite measures, i.e. 




Q1 to 2016-Q4, but excluded from 2008-Q3 to 2009-Q2 which are 
the periods of the Great Recession. 
The two main dependent variables are constructed by the way 
in Kim, Shin (2019). The assumption has been presumed as Kim and 
Shin did, that the international debt issuance by residence represents 
onshore issuance and the issuance by nationality is the sum of 
offshore and onshore debt issuance. Therefore, we can 
approximately reach into offshore and onshore international debts 
issuance. The two international debt issuances can be collected in 
Bank in International Settlements (BIS), and following Kim and 
Shin’s approach by dividing with trend GDP. 
Independent variables selected by references normally follow their 
ways. First, real GDP growth for both global and domestic are 
collected from OECD and IMF IFS. The global real GDP growth has 
been selected for G7(United States, United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, and Russia). The global real short 
interest rates have been built as Byrne, Fiess (2016) did in their 
paper: 3 Month US Treasury Bill rates deflated ex-post by the 
annual US Consumer Price inflation. Global uncertainty has been 




as most these do. The global real non-oil commodity price is 
measured as Reinhart, Reinhart (2009), deflating advanced countries’ 
non-oil commodity price by US wholesale price index.  
Domestic real interest rates also followed the method by Byrne, 
Fiess (2016): nominal lending interest rates deflated by GDP deflator. 
Domestic capital control has been represented by diverse measures 
in reference, but I choose Andres Fernandez et al. (2015). However, 
during a robust check, I tried a more popular measure of financial 
integration, such as Chinn, Ito (2006). For the last, domestic financial 
structure has been represented by Debt to GDP (%) from Abbas et 
al. (2010). As capital control is attempted by much more measure, 
the financial structure has been rechecked by other measures, either.  
 
2) Regression model 
The proposed regression model is as follows: 
Bond , = ∆𝑌 + 𝑟 + 𝑉 + ∆𝑃 + ∆𝑌 , + 𝑟 , + 𝐶𝐶 , + 𝐹𝑆 , + 𝜀 ,   (1) 
, which Bond ,  is international debt issuance whether offshore or 
onshore,  ∆𝑌  is global real GDP growth, 𝑟  is global real short 




global real non-oil commodity price change. Similar to the above 
definition, ∆𝑌 ,  is country i’s real GDP growth, 𝑟 ,  is domestic real 
interest rates, 𝐶𝐶 ,  is domestic capital control, and 𝐹𝑆 ,  represents 
financial structure for country i. The error term, 𝜀 ,  follows a normal 
distribution. 
 
Table 1. Regression with each period 
   Offshore issuance  Onshore issuance 








global factor       
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Period terms  34 30  34 30 




R-squared  0.06517 0.13965  0.04218 0.05319 
 
 To compare two international debt issuance regressions in 
terms of the crisis period, I conduct pre-crisis regressions and 
post-crisis regressions. Table 1 includes two big sections: offshore 
and onshore debt issuance as dependent variables, with each before 
the crisis and after the crisis. Since some coefficients brought 
opposite signs through two different periods, it is compelling that the 
offshore debt issuance has been changed its role after the crisis.  
First, in the offshore part, global uncertainty has negatively 
affected the offshore debt before the crisis, while it positively effects 
after the crisis. In the domestic perspective, regardless of slightly 
low significance, capital control changes their effects through crisis 
from negative to positive. Similarly, the financial structure of each 
country reverses its effect during periods.  
 
 On the sides of the onshore debt issuance, only global real 
non-oil commodity price reverses during the crisis. After the crisis, 




the absolute value of coefficients. This increase could be observed in 
domestic parts either, except financial structure. 
To compare the results by type of issuance in all periods, pre-
crisis onshore debt is more vulnerable to factors than pre-crisis 
offshore debt. Secondly, results tell that offshore and onshore did not 
show any difference in sign, except for global and domestic real GDP 
growths and financial structure. On the other hand, after the crisis, 
offshore and onshore debt issuances are distinguished by a sign. For 
example, global uncertainty influences two debt issuances oppositely, 
and domestic capital control and domestic financial structure do, 
either. 
The above results tell that through the crisis, while onshore debt 
issuance maintains the status, offshore debt issuance changes its role 
and becomes opposite to onshore debt issuance. Nonetheless, above 
regressions lack statistical guarantees in irrefutable components 
such as capital control. To enhance reliability, I come up with 
detoured regression, using interaction effects. 
 
Specifically, I regress the above model with total period 




which indicate 1 in the pre-crisis period. To sum up, the regression 
has formed with global and domestic components and those 
interaction terms as follows: 
Bond , = ∆𝑌 + ∆𝑌 × 𝐷 + 𝑟 + 𝑟 × 𝐷 + 𝑉 + 𝑉 × 𝐷 + ∆𝑃 +
                    ∆𝑃 × 𝐷 + ∆𝑌 , + ∆𝑌 , × 𝐷 + 𝑟 , + 𝑟 , × 𝐷 + 𝐶𝐶 , +
                        𝐶𝐶 , × 𝐷 + 𝐹𝑆 , + 𝐹𝑆 , × 𝐷 + 𝜀 ,     (2) 
, which 𝐷  represents a dummy variable when it is 1 if the period is 
before the Great Recession.  
 
Table 2. Regression with all interaction terms 
    Offshore issuance Onshore issuance 
global factor       



































real commodity price 
change×dummy 




domestic factor       










































    








    
Period terms   64 
Number of countries  15 
R-squared   0.12981 0.05552 
 
 If an interaction term is statistically significant, it is 
interpreted as the dependent variable changes significantly its 
reaction toward the independent variable during the crisis. So, 
including all interaction terms, as Table 2, I conclude that only two 
global components and two domestic components have significant 
interaction effects for two international debt issuances. Those 
components are as follows: global uncertainty, global real commodity 
price change, domestic capital control, and domestic financial 
structure.  




Bond , = ∆𝑌 + 𝑟 + 𝑉 + 𝑉 × 𝐷 + ∆𝑃 + ∆𝑃 × 𝐷 + ∆𝑌 , + 𝑟 , +
𝐶𝐶 , + 𝐶𝐶 , × 𝐷 + 𝐹𝑆 , + 𝐹𝑆 , × 𝐷 + 𝜀 ,   (3) 
Other variables did not change from equation (1) and equation (2).  
 
 
3. Regression result 
Table 3. Regression with selected interaction terms 
  Offshore issuance Onshore issuance 








global factor       



















real commodity price 
change 








domestic factor         






































     
Period terms 64 




R-squared 0.09752 0.04956 
 
1) Before the Great Recession 
 At the side of offshore debt issuance, both global and 
domestic real GDP growths and real interest rates did not show any 
significance. So, I mainly concentrated on four main independent 
components: global uncertainty, global real non-oil commodity price 
change, domestic capital control, and domestic financial structure. 
These coefficients between the offshore debt and the onshore debt 
issuances are showing noticeable outcomes; they possess negative 
signs, except for domestic financial structure.  
For instance, the coefficients of global uncertainty in offshore and 
onshore are -0.000234(0.028) and -0.000329(0.078). Both 
coefficients have negative but significant correlations with two 
international debts issuance, which mean that two international debt 
issuances react to global uncertainty in the same way. In other words, 
if the global economy became unstable and unpredictable, in the 
emerging market, both offshore and onshore international debts 
decrease their issue. In the same knowledge, when real non-oil 




decrease. This is because advanced countries are responsible for the 
majority of investment in the emerging market. So, when commodity 
price inflates, to smooth lifetime consumption, advanced countries 
decrease their investment, especially toward the emerging market. 
Domestic components can be interpreted similarly. If the government 
of emerging countries restricts international capital, it is obvious to 
predict that international debts issuance will decrease. At that point, 
coefficients of both international debt issuances in capital control are 
negative in pre-crisis.  
However, the domestic financial structure shows an opposite signal 
between two international debt issuances. The coefficient of offshore 
debt issuance is -0.00005(0.000), while the coefficient of onshore 
debt issuance is 0.000219(0.077). When the emerging country has a 
stable and concrete financial system, such as reliable law and 
uncorrupt government, a bond is typically issued by an onshore 
method, not by an offshore method. That is a much more unstable 
financial system brings, more offshore debt is issued. So, it could be 
said that according to the level of financial structure, offshore debt 




majority of factors did not attract borrowers to issue offshore debt, 
i.e. offshore debt was identical with onshore debt. 
 
 
2) After the Great Recession 
 The most interesting finding is that after the crisis, the 
offshore debt issuance specialized their role itself as moving 
oppositely compared with onshore issuance toward global and 
domestic circumstances. Two international debts of once similar role 
diversify their usage, therefore, their coefficient’s signs become 
opposite in post-crisis. In the offshore debt side, the first column of 
Table 3, I can find that the coefficients of global uncertainty and 
domestic capital control changed their sign from negative correlation 
-0.000234(0.028) and -0.009588(0.000) to positive correlation 
0.000471(0.025) and 0.009883(0.08).  
In the onshore sides, the last two columns of Table 3, the 
coefficients of real non-oil commodity price change reverse from 
negative correlation -0.001874(0.006) to positive correlation 




system, such changes lead to four opposite reactions toward two 
international debt issuances.  
For example, when global uncertainty increases or advanced 
countries hesitate to invest emerging countries, emerging countries 
react to issue bonds by offshore debt rather than onshore ones. A 
similar situation happens to the other three components: global real 
non-oil commodity price change, domestic capital control, and 
domestic financial structure. Therefore, after the Great Recession, 
investors and borrowers in the emerging markets changed their 
strategy, i.e. substituting two international debt issuances. By doing 
so, an individual emerging country can pursue stable states in 
international capital flows, independent of global and domestic 
circumstances.  
Offshore debt issuance is specialized in undesirable circumstances 
for investment. When the global financial condition is not welcoming 
emerging countries, such as a higher global uncertainty or an 
increase in a real non-oil commodity price change, offshore debt 
shows much more issuance. Their correlations are each 
0.000471(0.025) and –0.013373(0.057). In other words, as the 




issue bonds by offshore debt issuance. The most logical narration for 
such a situation is that a subsidiary which directly issues the 
international bond for home country is normally in other advanced 
countries, which pretends to be an advanced countries’ company. 
Even if the subsidiary is well-known as an emerging countries’ 
company, because the subsidiary is partially under the advanced 
countries’ control, much more reliability occurs than the home 
company in emerging countries. In other words, investor prefers to 
invest in the subsidiary in advanced countries rather than the head 
office in emerging countries. The same explanation can be adjusted 
into domestic components.  
Offshore debt issuance has a positive correlation 0.009883(0.08) 
with domestic capital control and negative correlation -
0.000252(0.000) with domestic financial structure. If home emerging 
country is having a strict policy toward international capital, so that 
hard to finance from outsides, the company gathers money by issuing 
offshore debt from a subsidiary’s country. If the home countries’ 
financial system is weak, the same thing will happen.  
Therefore, much more hardship happens to finance in emerging 





 Opposite situation emerges in onshore debt issuance. 
Onshore debt issuance has a negative correlation -0.00074(0.062) 
with global uncertainty and positive correlation 0.042818(0.001) 
with a real non-oil commodity price change. The reaction toward 
global uncertainty is the right opposite of offshore debt issuance. 
However, real non-oil commodity price change demands an 
additional explanation. Reinhart, Reinhart (2010) explained this 
positive relationship between international debt in emerging 
countries and real commodity price change by exports. Since the 
main producers of a commodity are emerging countries in these 
decades, when commodity price increases, investors love to invest in 
emerging countries rather than advanced countries.  
As the global factors did, the onshore debt issuance has an opposite 
sign in two important domestic components, capital control, and 
financial structure. Each coefficient is -0.018145(0.065) and 
0.000149(0.057). This illustrates that when domestic financial 
flexibility improves, emerging countries are eager to issue onshore 




While offshore debt did not show statistically significant with 
domestic real GDP growth and domestic real interest rates, onshore 
debt did show both positive correlation, 0.002973(0.006) and 
0.000108(0.046). Because offshore subsidiary is not directly 
connected with home countries, it is natural that there will be no 
correlation between domestic growth and domestic real interest rates. 
However, onshore debt is somewhat different. Since the bond 
depends a lot on their own countries, if the domestic growth grows 
or real interest rates increase, the country became attractive to 
invest. Finally, as the country grows its economy and productivity, 
the onshore bond increases its issue.  
 
4. Robustness check 
 
1) Global components robust check 
 To confirm the assertion, I conduct several robust checks. 
First, I attempt to clarify the influence of global uncertainty and real 




onshore debt issuance. The main problem of global factors’narration 
is that significant global components were not generally used in 
classical economic models. To assure the irreplaceable 
characteristics of two unfamiliar global factors, the robust model 
suggests replacing variables that might be omitted variable.  
 
Table 4 in the Appendix 
 
 First, real short interest rates are replaced by real long 
interest rates. The robust results can be found in the first column of 
each debt issuance in Table 4. Byrne, Fiess (2016) mentioned that 
real short interest rates explain much more bond flows better than 
real long interest rates, but to express the importance of real interest 
as extended definition, I substitute the short rates to long rates and 
come up with similar results with both original results of two 
international debt issuances.  
Secondly, it is valuable to call in a question that real non-oil 
commodity price change should be included and dealt as an essential 




factor by Reinhart, Reinhart (2008). In the long term, commodity 
price will affect indirectly two international debt issuances by real 
long interest rates, or in a large economy, it can directly affect 
international debt issuance by global liquidity. So, it is necessary to 
check whether regression replaced by global real long interest rates 
or global liquidity keeps their analysis. The second and third columns 
in Table 4 have introduced those regressions. Long story short, the 
global liquidity did not show the influence on two international debts 
and even did not replace the real non-oil commodity price. The third 
column shows the real long interest rates substituting real non-oil 
commodity price change. The result illustrates that only with the real 
long interest rates, the regressions cannot control the variables 
better than the real non-oil commodity price change. While current 
economic models lack sophisticated analysis for global inflation to 
emerging countries, it seems to be true that the real non-oil 
commodity price has its unique role in emerging countries. 
 
2) Domestic components robust check 
 Domestic components have been checked for their robustness 





Table 5 & Table 6 in the Appendix 
 
 Firstly, domestic real interest rates have been replaced by 
real interest rates measured by the World Bank year by year. The 
results can be found in the first column of Table 5 and Table 6. 
Secondly, domestic capital control has been attempted for specific 
measures, bond control in Andres Fernandez et al. (2015) and 
another well-known financial openness measure Chinn, Ito 
(2008)’s measure. Two capital restraint’s substitutes are 
indicated in the second and third columns of each international debt 
issuance. Lastly, the financial structure has been represented by 
diverse measures in Table 5 and Table 6, so I additionally checked 
with stock market capitalization to GDP (%) in Beck et al. (2009) and 
Private credit to GDP (%) in Abbas et al. (2010). The results are in 
the fourth and fifth columns of Table 5 and Table 6. All robust checks 








 Before the Great Recession, the offshore debt and onshore 
debt did not distinguish themselves, so offshore debt was not 
exploited a lot. The only little amount of offshore debt has been used 
for the countries which have low qualified financial structure.  
 However, after the Great Recession, in emerging countries, 
offshore debt evolved to execute another role, as a substitute for 
onshore debt. For such purpose, regardless of an additional hassle 
stage of offshore debt issuance, offshore debt has been increased its 
amounts and issuance. If global economic conditions get severe to 
finance, such as an increased uncertainty or low profit from exports, 
investors in advanced countries hesitate to provide money to 
emerging countries. To trade off the loss of international bonds, 
emerging countries borrow from offshore debt, which does not 
directly connect to emerging economies. On the side of emerging 
countries, they prefer to issue offshore debt, when their domestic 
conditions are going worse to finance, such as unwelcomed policy on 




Therefore, offshore debt is the method for emerging countries to 
manage international liquidity risk, by reacting oppositely to onshore 
debt especially on global uncertainty, global real non-oil commodity 
price change, domestic capital control, and domestic financial 
structure. 
 
 To overcome the problem of less observation, this paper has 
used the interaction effects. Furthermore, by doing so, it proved 
offshore debt issuance’s responses toward some variables have 
been changed through the Great Recession. However, because the 
methodology is not dealing with the main question directly, that what 
made the offshore debt increased through the crisis more attempts 
should be tried, such as regressing with each pre-crisis and post-
crisis. Not only the empirical approach but also modeling should be 
done because most of the significant factors are disconnected with 
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Table 4. The Robustness check for global components 
 Offshore issuance Onshore issuance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
global factor             






















real long interest rates 
0.000171  
(0.794) 




 -0.000968   
(0.280) 
uncertainty before crisis 
-0.000242 ** 
(0.029) 






-0.000391   
(0.230) 
-0.000306   
(0.280) 













real commodity price change before crisis 
-0.003991 * 
(0.081) 
  0.000921 *** 
(0.008) 
  
real commodity price change after crisis 
-0.01542 ** 
(0.027) 





 -0.002655    
(0.912) 





  0.002795  
(0.9) 
    -0.027827  
(0.511) 
  
domestic factor       





























































0.000206   
(0.109) 
0.00017   
(0.102) 













              
Constant before crisis 
0.033457 ** 
(0.050) 
0.059354    
(0.865) 




0.031659   
(0.792) 
-0.003721   
(0.201) 













              
Period terms (T) 64 64 
Number of countries (n) 15 15 




Table 5. The Robustness check for domestic factor (Offshore debt issuance) 
  Offshore issuance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
global factor       




















































real commodity price change 
before crisis 
-0.002682    
(0.249) 
-0.002553    
(0.139) 




0.002508    
(0.119) 
-0.004886    
(0.125) 














domestic factor             














































































              
Constant before crisis 

























              
Period terms 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 12 15 





Table 6. The Robustness check for domestic factor (Onshore debt issuance) 
  Onshore issuance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
global factor       


























uncertainty before crisis 
-0.000293    
(0.112) 



















































domestic factor             



























































0.000187    
(0.130) 

















              


























              
Period terms 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 12 15 






Onshore and Offshore international debts issuance divided by trend 
GDP: BIS  
Independent variables 
Global factors 
Real GDP growth: G7 real GDP growth in OECD 
Real short interest rates: 3 Month US Treasury Bill rate and 10 years 
US government bond yield deflated ex-post by the annual US 
Consumer Price inflation from IMF following Byrne, Fiess (2015) 
Uncertainty: VIX from CBOE 
ADV real non-oil commodity price: IMF based upon Non-oil 
commodity prices deflated by US wholesale price index following 
Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) 
Domestic factors 
Real GDP growth: OECD, IMF IFS and Chang et al. (2016) 
Real interest rates: nominal lending interest rates deflated by GDP 
deflator from IMF IFS following by Byrne, Fiess (2015) 




Financial Structure: Debt to GDP (%) from Abbas et al. (2010), 
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP and Stock market 






국제적 충격을 국내로 전달하는 문제를 지닌, 국외 채권은 2008년 금
융위기 이래로 개발도상국을 중심으로 꾸준히 증가하고 있다. 위 논문은 
이러한 변화가 금융위기 이후 국외 채권이 기존의 국제 채권이 발행되기 
어려워 그 대체재로서 존재하기 때문이라고 주장한다. 즉, 개발도상국 
내에서 국제 유동성의 수준을 외·내부 환경과 독립하여 일정 수준으로 
유지하기 위해 국외 채권을 활용하는 것으로 보인다. 가령, 국제적 불확
실성이 높아지거나, 국제 비유류 상품 가격이 감소하거나, 개발도상국의 
외국 자본에 대한 규제가 강화되고 그 자본 시장 구조가 취약해지는 경
우들이다. 금융위기를 기점으로 국외 채권의 활용 방도가 달라짐을 보이
기 위해, 상호작용 효과를 활용하여 국외채권이 위의 반응들에 어떤 식
으로 변화하였는지를 보인다. 
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